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"…Liquidate labour, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate… it 
will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living 
will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be 
adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people." 
his was the advice of US Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon to President Herbert 
Hoover in 1931. It is never advisable to mix economic policy with morals, as events have 
shown. One can question whether the advice was even taken since President Hoover actually 
implemented some expansionary policies. But it is clear that the wave of bank insolvencies and 
foreclosures that swept through the US during the early 1930s contributed to the transformation of a 
crisis into the Great Depression.  
In Europe we have to ask ourselves today whether the opposite approach, i.e. no liquidation at all, is 
much better. 
After the Lehman experience, the official policy line in Europe is that liquidation must now be 
avoided at all costs. This applies in particular to sovereigns and their banks.   
How is this policy implemented? Most public attention has focused on the bail-out of countries via 
the EU/IMF package of €110 billion for Greece and later the creation of the so-called European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). But given that banks and the government are so intertwined, it 
does not matter whether it is the sovereign that is over-indebted (Greece) and thus drags down its 
banks, or whether, on the contrary, it is the banking sector that is insolvent and drags down the 
sovereign (Ireland). 
A much larger ‘bail-out’ has actually taken place via the balance sheet of the ECB. Here again 
public attention has focused on a minor aspect, namely the direct purchases of distressed 
government bonds by the ECB. However, the portfolio of government bonds held by the ECB under 
its ‘securities markets programme’ has so far amounted only to about €60 billion, a rather modest 
sum when measured against the overall balance sheet of the Bank, which now is close to €2,000 
billion. Moreover, by buying bonds in the secondary market, the ECB has not provided any fresh 
money to the countries concerned. It has only increased the price at which some investors were able 
to sell their holdings of Greek and other bonds. 
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The ECB, however, is providing direct support to the countries in trouble via its normal monetary 
policy operations, which allow the banking systems of these countries to refinance themselves at the 
official rate of 1% to the tune of hundreds of billions of euros. This represents an infusion of 
liquidity of an unprecedented magnitude given the small size of these economies. For example, the 
banking systems of Greece and Ireland have now received funding worth about 40% and 50% of 
GDP, respectively. See table below. It is clear that without this injection of essentially free liquidity, 
both countries would have been insolvent a long time ago. 
Lending by central banks to credit institutions as of August 2010 
  
Total 
(€ billions) 
Lending by 
CB relative 
to deposits 
Lending by 
CB relative 
to GDP 
         
Greece 96.1  26%  40% 
Ireland 95.1  14%  60% 
Portugal 50.1  15%  30% 
Spain 119.0  5%  11% 
Source: Own calculations from the websites of the national central banks. 
 
This huge infusion of liquidity is of course just a by-product of the way the ECB’s monetary policy 
works and not a tailor-made approach for countries in trouble (unlike the securities markets 
programme and the EFSF), but it implies a considerable subsidy. No Greek bank could have funded 
itself in the interbank market over the last year; even the government has had only limited access 
for short-term funds under the protection of the EU-sponsored bail-out.  
Assuming that the risk premium for Greek banks would be equal to that of the Greek government 
(say for five years, i.e. outside the EU/IMF umbrella for the next three years), i.e. around 700-800 
basis points, the lending of the ECB to the Greek banking system amounts to an implicit subsidy 
worth around 2.8 to 3.2% of GDP (7 to 8% of 40% of GDP). This is more than the country receives 
in structural funds from the EU. Even for Ireland, the implicit subsidy is worth about 2% of GDP, if 
one applies a risk premium of 400 basis points on the financing supplied by the ECB. 
Insolvency can certainly be avoided as long as liquidity is (almost) free and available in unlimited 
amounts. Europe has clearly chosen ‘liquefaction’ over liquidation. However, unlimited 
‘liquefaction’ has its disadvantages.   
First of all, it is obviously not a solution for insolvent debtors; it just postpones the day of 
reckoning.  
Secondly, it is addictive. Recourse to the ECB will remain by far the cheapest source of funds for 
banks in the euro periphery. They will thus try to increase their recourse to ECB funding all the 
time, with the result that the risk on the balance sheet of the ECB will be increasing. This is why the 
ECB had to recently tighten its eligibility criteria for the collateral it accepts, as banks in the 
periphery (and some weak banks in core euro states) had obviously a tendency to transform ever-
more risky parts of their assets into securities that they could use as collateral for the ECB’s 
windows. This illustrates a further problem: Political instances have to take over the function of 
capital markets. The ECB and the EFSF now decide which countries and banks have access to 
funding (and at what cost).
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1 Representatives of the ECB have rightly pointed out that the capital market had made a fundamental mistake in 
funding Greece for too long at excessively low risk premia; and the market (and the ratings agencies) might now err in 
the opposite direction by overestimating the risk of insolvency. But who can guarantee that the ECB is right to lend 
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Is there an alternative between indiscriminate liquidation and continuing liquefaction? The obvious 
way out should be controlled rescheduling and/or restructuring in order to avoid turning part of euro 
periphery into ‘zombie countries’. 
The problem is that no debtor will ever appear insolvent (and admit to it) in an environment of 
essentially free money. No debtor will thus have an interest to engage in a restructuring or 
rescheduling as long as interest rates remain close to zero and liquidity is available without limits.
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A ‘Japanese’ scenario in which financial markets cease to function properly is thus becoming ever 
more likely for Europe as well. 
                                                      
2 Moreover, the ECB would have to admit a serious miscalculation if Greece were to restructure its (privately held) 
public debt.  A restructuring of the official debt seems imminent as the maturity of the loans provided under the 
EU/IMF package of €110 billion is likely to be extended soon. 